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Abstract 
Institutional ownership of commercial banks is of great importance given that it as an internal corporate 
governance mechanism. Different levels of institutional ownership in firms as revealed by recent studies indicate 
significance differences in their monitoring capability that subsequently impact on performance. Institution 
ownership, such as those made through pension funds and insurance companies play a critical role in influencing 
the firm’s performance, owing to the knowledge and experience they posses. This study sought to ascertain the 
relationship between institutional ownership and performance of commercial banks in Kenya that are licensed as 
companies under the Company Act Cap 486 and as banks under the Banking Act Cap 488. A survey was 
undertaken on 43 commercial banks that were operational between year 2001 and 2013. Bank performance was 
defined by three performance indicators namely: return on asset, return on equity and Tobin’s Q ratio whereas 
bank size was adopted as a moderating variable. Secondary data was collected from: annual financial reports, 
The Kenya Banking Survey 2013, Central Bank of Kenya bank’s annual supervisory reports, commercial banks 
websites, Central Bank of Kenya website, Bankscope, and annual returns filed by banks found at the Registrar of 
companies at the Attorney General Chambers Nairobi and returns filled at The Nairobi Security Exchange by 
listed banks. The data collected was analyzed using both descriptive statistics and inferential statistics where 
hierarchical regression under the panel data framework with the help of SPSS version 21.0 software was used. 
The findings of the study indicated that there is no relationship between institutional ownership and performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya when ROE, ROA and TBQ were used as performance measures and that bank 
size ha a moderating effect in this relationship. 
Keywords and Abbreviations: Institutional ownership, corporate governance, Central Bank of Kenya, 
institutional investors ,firm performance  
V.I.F.-Variance inflation factor, ROA-Return on asset, ROE-Return on equity, TBQ-Tobin’s Q ratioCBK-
Central Bank of Kenya, CEO- Chief Executive officer. 
 
 1.  Introduction 
Davis & Steil, (2001) define Institutional investors as specialized financial institutions, which manage savings on 
behalf of other investors with a view of attaining a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, maximization of 
returns and maturity of claims. Institutional investors take the form of: banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds and investment funds. Under normal circumstances, institutional investors tend to invest in large volumes. 
Due to the high stakes they hold, they are able to exercise controls on the action of the management making them 
be in tandem with the shareholder wealth maximization objective. Seifer et al. (2005) using samples of firms 
from United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan find a significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and firms performance in these countries. It is widely acknowledged that institutional investors 
holders posses the capability of boosting market performance by offering high level financing, experience and 
knowledge to the market in which they have invested (Gurunlu and Gursoy 2010). 
 
As the size of institutional investors grows; so does the potential for improved control over companies in which 
they hold stocks and hence reduced effects of adverse incentive problems.  Institutional investors are known not 
to move into and out of the firm without influencing the share price. Hirschman, (1970) identified the exercise of 
powers of institutional investors within an ‘exit and voice’ framework. He argued that the dissatisfaction of 
institutional investors may be expressed directly to the management through voicing of concerns at hand (the 
voice option) or by selling their shares held (the exit option). However, the exit option has been found not to be 
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the most viable option to many institutional investors in view of the size of their holding. Quick exit may lead to 
depressed share price  resulting from increased supply of such stocks onto the market which on overall may 
significantly erode shareholders wealth. In view of the above, institutional investors are forced to provide an 
extra eye in monitoring the operations of the firm by focusing on annual  financial reports especially the profit 
and loss statement. Elyasiani & Jia (2008) find that institutional ownership has a significant positive impact on 
the performance of banks. Therefore it is expected that institutional share ownership should have a positive 
relationship with performance of the commercial banks. The question that ought to be answered is whether there 
is a relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance by specifically focusing on the Kenyan 
commercial banking sector using the three performance indicators namely: ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio. 
 
2. Review of related literature 
Institutional investors are considered to be major players in many financial institutions and markets. Their 
influence on corporate performance has increasingly been noticed as a result of adoption of structural 
transformation programs. The structural transformation programs mainly focus on the privatization policy that 
has been adopted by many developing countries Kenya included. One can argue that the major players in many 
of the privatization processes that are taking place through capital markets and financial institutions all over the 
world over are institutional investors. Studies on the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance provide mixed findings. There are findings to the effect that there is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance, some find a negative relationship and some do not find any 
relationship at all. 
 
McConnell & Servaes (1990) in a study of the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance using a cross-sectional sample of 1173 and 1093 firms listed on the New York stock exchange in 
1976 and 1986, respectively find a strong positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors and Tobin’s Q. They attribute this to the efficient monitoring role played. These findings 
are supported by Chaganti &Damanpour (1991) and Han & Suk (1998) who find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance that they attribute to improved efficient monitoring. Chung et al. 
(2002) find that large institutional shareholdings deter managers of a firm from pursuing opportunistic earnings 
management through discretionary accrual choices that negatively impact on performance. However, it should be 
noted that given the enormous costs required for monitoring, monitoring activities are left to large institutional 
investors who have the financial muscle and hold high stake of wealth in firms. Since the share holding of 
institutional investors is higher than those of the board of directors, institutional investors are known to possess a 
greater incentive to monitor managers than members of the board (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
  
Clay (2001) finds a positive impact of institutional ownership on firm performance to the effect that 1% increase 
in institutional ownership enhances firm performance by 0.75%. They attribute this to the expectation that 
institutional investors would reduce the principal‐agent problem between managers and shareholders, which in 
turn would lower the incentives and opportunities for managers to control earnings while raising the 
effectiveness of the management and the performance of the firm. In the same context, the corporate governance 
proposals sponsored by institutional investors receive more favorable attention than those sponsored by 
independent individuals (Gillan and Starks (2000). Barclay &Holderness (1990) and Mikkelson & Ruback 
(1991) find that institutional investors can force value maximization in firms which definitely impacts on firm 
performance. In a study of firms facing control problems, it was found that on average an institutional investor 
was more likely to vote out a non-performing CEO and would  participate in making other decisions of the firm 
than a non-institution investor (Brickley et al.,1988). Baysinger & Butler (1985) and Hansen & Hill (1991) find 
that the level of institutional ownership in a firm is associated with increased research and development 
expenditures that positively impact on performance by way of reduced cost of doing business and increased 
productivity.  
 
Foster & Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al.,(1999) find that information on firms is revealed more rapidly 
when there are greater numbers of  institutional investors. In support of the above findings the signaling theory 
proposes that institutional investors have the potential of providing a credible mechanism for sharing information 
among other investors. This is due to information differences that exist between outsiders and insiders in a firm. 
Outsiders may possess superior information compared to insiders. The above information gap implies that the 
firm has the capability of providing signals about its performance to the market and investors. Signaling theory 
assumes that investors can discern information regarding the future prospects of the firm. Such information may 
take the form of: leverage, ownership changes or dividend announcements. 
 
Poudel & Hovey (2012) and Bino & Tomar (2007) all agree in their studies that; there is a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and bank performance. These findings are in line with those of Mikkelson & 
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Ruback, (1985), Le et al., (2006) and Ramzi, (2008), who all agree on the important role of institutional 
shareholders in monitoring the performance of the firm. However, there are related findings to the effect that 
when institutional investors hold relatively few shares they can easily liquidate their investments if the firm 
performs poorly, and therefore will have less incentive to monitor it. Under such circumstances, the goal of 
maintaining the liquidity of their holdings and their desire for short-term profit outweighs the benefits of 
monitoring the management in the hope of improving the long-term performance of the firm. But if the 
shareholdings by institutions are high and the shares held are less marketable, the longer the period such shares 
will be held the greater will be the incentive of institutional investors to monitor the management [(Bhide,1994; 
Demirag, 1998; Maug, 1998)]. 
 
Recent studies point to the fact that institutional investors posses differing characteristics [Pound (1988), Hartzell 
and Starks (2002) and Parrino et al., (2003)]. Some institutional investors have either existing or potential 
business relationships with firms in which they hold shares. For such investors to protect those relationships they 
may be less willing to vote against the decision brought forward by the management. The second type of 
institutional investors relates to those who do not hold business relationships with the firms in which they hold 
equity stakes.  Based on the above characteristics, Brickley et al,. (1988) and Kochhar & David (1996), classify 
institutional investors into two major categories: pressure-resistant investors and pressure-sensitive investors. 
Pressure-resistant institutional investors refer to those institutional investors who only have an investment 
relationships with firms in which they hold equity stakes e.g. pension funds, mutual funds, endowments and 
foundations. Pressure-sensitive institutional investors on the other hand refer to those institutional investors who 
are likely to have both investment and business relationships with the firms in which they hold equity stake. 
They include insurance companies, banks, and non-bank trusts.  
 
Pound (1988) postulates two hypotheses which suggest that a negative relationship exists between institutional 
ownership and firm value and performance thereof. These are: the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and the 
strategic-alignment hypothesis. The conflict-of-interest hypothesis asserts that due business relationships with 
the firm in which they hold equity stakes, pressure sensitive institutional investors are forced to vote in line with 
the management since voting against management might negatively affect their business relationships. Heard 
&Sherman (1987) further argues that the investment and business relationships held by institutional investors 
could create a conflict of interest between institutional investors and the management since the power gained 
from their ownership stake may be tampered by their reliance on the firm for business activity. Therefore it is 
more likely that there will be a negative relationship between the high presence of pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors and firm performance and it is expected that there will be a positive relationship between the high 
presence of pressure-resistant institutional holders and firm performance. From the on-going it is expected that 
since pressure-resistant investors have no business relationships with a firm they should be able to monitor the 
firm better based on the strategic alliance hypothesis.  
 
Woidtke (2002), finds a negative relationship between activist public pension fund ownership and Tobin’s Q but 
a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and private pension funds. The positive relationship between private 
pension funds and TBQ ratio is attributed to the fact that: private pension funds have large amounts of money to 
invest for a longer period of time. These moneys are not invested in a small amount of firms because such moves 
would involve taking unnecessarily high risk. This makes institutional investors not to optimally diversify their 
portfolio. Thus institutional investors are only willing to hold a large stake in a firm for two reasons: to exercise 
the private benefits of control and have almost full control in the firm and secondly to ensure that the costs and 
the extra risk that comes along with the large holdings do not override the benefits (Holderness 2003). 
 
Conversely, Denis & Denis, (1995), find that top management turnover is likely to be high in the presence of 
high ownership by financial institutions which may negatively impact on firm performance. This is due to the 
absence of memory on some important aspects of the firm that could foster performance resulting from high 
management turnover. These findings are in line with those of Htay, (2012) and Mohammad & Shahid, (2012) 
that there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and performance of banks. However, finds 
no relationship between institutional ownership and banks performance. Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et 
al. (1996), Duggal & Millar (1999), Faccio & Lasfer (2000) and Enobakhare, (2010) find no significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance making it not clear as to whether institutional 
investor stock ownership impacts on firm performance.  
 
 3. Research Methodology 
A survey was conducted on the 43 commercial banks operating in Kenya between 2001 and 2013. The data 
collected was analyzed using descriptive and hierarchical multiple regression under the panel data framework. 
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77% of the banks participated in the study. This rate of participants was rated good given that the data obtained 
was capable of enabling the researchers arrive at a satisfactory conclusion ( Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003).  
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed to ascertain the relationship between institutional ownership and 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya as used in the related study Matanda et al,( 2015) that was of the 
form: 
Yit =βo+β1 X1it+β2X2it 
Yit =βo+β1 X1it+β2X2it+ εit 
Where: 
Yit -Is bank performance measured by Return on assets, Return on Equity and Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Subscripts i and t represent firm and time period, respectively. 
βo- intercept 
X1- Institutional ownership:  
X2- Control variable bank size measured by log of total assets. 
εit   -error term.. 
 Dependent variables and their measurement 
 Return on asset, return on equity and Tobin’s Q ratio were designated as dependent variables, institutional 
ownership as an independent variable and bank size as a moderating variable as used in a related study (Matanda 
 et al 2015). 
 Return on Assets is a purely an accounting-based measure computed from the banks financial statement data 
(CBK 2001-2013).  It is the ratio of annual profit before tax to the total assets i.e.          
     ROA=       Profit before tax           
                       Total assets  
A higher ROA indicates that the banks management is able to generate income by utilizing the assets at its 
disposal. 
Return on Equity (ROE) is an indicator of how effective the management team in a company is converting the 
reinvested money into profits. It is the ratio of profit after tax to shareholders equity i.e. 
                    ROE=   Net income (Profit after tax) 
                                 Shareholders’ equity 
A higher ROE indicates that the banks ability to generate cash internally. 
Tobin’s Q ratio (TOBQ) is the  ratio of market value of equity to the net worth of the firm. 
                      Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) = Market value of Equity 
                                                          Net worth of the bank      
Where market value of equity is the difference between the market value of the bank and the value of debt and 
net worth is the amount by which the bank’s assets exceed liabilities. If the calculated Q ratio for the bank is 
greater than 1, there is a strong incentive for investment, that is to say, presence of valuable growth opportunities 
for the bank or the bank is earning a rate of return that is larger than the its replacement cost. Since it is 
expressed as the bank’s market value to its replacement value, TBQ ratio decreases over time as more 
participants are enticed to set up more banks leading to a reduction in firm value.TBQ ratio has extensively been 
used by academic researchers and it stands out as one of the best measures of the market performance of the 
firm. 
For unquoted banks the the estimated market value of equity was calculated using the formula: 
. 
   
The estimated market value of equity of the unquoted bank was based on the assumption that the unquoted bank 
possessed characteristics that were similar or almost similar to the quoted bank in terms of share holders’ equity 
   Estimated value of equity of unquoted bank =Current price of  X  Own funds (of unquoted bank.)  
                                                                         quoted bank            Own funds (of quoted bank.) 
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taking both the numerator and the denominator measures were taken at the same date. The estimated market 
value of the unquoted bank was thereafter divided with the net worth of the bank to arrive at the TBQ ratio. 
 
4. Findings 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Pariculars N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
ROA 416 -.13 .37 .0257 .03829 
ROE 416 -.67 1.25 .1244 .14974 
TBQ ratio 416 .00 9.13 .9387 .14218 
Bank size 416 2.88 5.51 4.1179 .60476 
Institutional 
ownership 
416 .00 .59 .1998 .16402 
 
The table 1 above provides descriptive statistical results on the dependent, independent and moderating variables 
that  were used in the empirical analysis of this study. The findings indicate that on average institutional 
ownership in the Kenyan commercial banks is 19.98% with a maximum of 59% that deviated by 16.402% on 
both sides of the mean. This invariably means that institutional investors on average control slightly close to a 
fifth of ownership stake in the Kenyan commercial banking sector with the remaining stake being held by block 
holders and private individuals. The average size of commercial banks in Kenya in terms of assets during the 
period of study was Kshs 13,119million, with the biggest bank holding an asset base of Kshs 323,594 million 
and the smallest bank holding assets worth Kshs 759 million that deviated by Kshs. 4.03 million on both sides of 
the mean. From the annual financial reports of commercial banks in Kenya, it can be it is revealed that between 
2008 and 2013, 54.83 % of the market share was controlled by six banks leaving 45.17% to 37 banks. From the 
above it can be concluded that the size of the bank is critical in enhancing the corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
The average ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio that are: accounting, financial and marketing indicators of performance 
were: 2.57%, 12.44% and .93.87%; with a maximum of 37%, 125% and 913% that deviated by 3.829%, 
14.974% and 14.218% on both sides of the mean respectively. The lowest ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio earned 
during the period of the study were: -13%, -67% and 0% respectively. The low average ROE of 12.44% 
indicates that the management of commercial banks in Kenya were not effective in utilizing shareholders funds 
in generating profits whereas the low average ROA of 2.57% indicates that the management of these banks were 
not efficiently utilizing the assets at their disposal to generate. The minimum TBQ ratio of 0% indicated that 
some banks earnings were not anywhere near their replacement cost. However, the average TBQ ratio of .9387 
closer to 1 indicated that commercial banks in Kenya were earning a rate of return that was closer to their 
replacement costs. The maximum TBQ ratio of 9.13 and an average of .9387 that is closer to 1 is a signal of 
better future performance. This may help explain why Kenya has a big number of banks in comparison to its size 
of the economy. These banks generate and further expect to generate returns greater than their replacement costs 
given that TBQ ratio is a forward-looking market measure of performance. The Q ratios from the analysis 
provide promising prospects. The presence of low ROA and ROE and a slightly closer to 1 TBQ ratio in this 
sector, has made the regulator (CBK) come up with the various prudential regulations on corporate governance 
(2001,2006 and 2013) that are geared at streamlining and controlling the activities of these institutions and hence 
protect shareholders interests. 
 
4.2 Hierarchical  Multiple Regression 
Hierarchical regression multiple regression analysis of the model that is below below was adopted in the 
analysis: 
Performance (ROA)it =f(β1X1it,β2X2it,)................................................................................. (1) 
Performance (ROA)it=βo+β1X1it+β2X2it….......................................................................... (2) 
Where: ROA is return on asset. 
             i and t are firm and time period respectively. 
The support for hierarchical regression was based on the expectation that there would be statistical significance 
for the addition of the control variable in the second step. The interpretation was based on the variable entered in 
the second step not withstanding whether or not the variables entered in the previous step were statistically 
significant. Two null hypotheses were tested: 
Ho1 The R
2
 change in the relationship between institutional ownership and commercial bank performance in 
Kenya was equal to zero. 
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Ho2 Bank size does not reduce the error in predicting the performance of commercial banks in Kenya. 
Table 1.Model summary
c
 
 
Performance 
indicator 
Model R R
2
 Adjusted 
R
2
 
R
2
 
change 
F 
change 
Df1 Df2 Sig. F 
change 
ROA
c
 1 .009
a
 .000 -.002 .000 .033 1 414 .857 
 2 .265
b
 .070 .066 .070 31.148 1 413 .000 
ROE
c
 1 .020
a
 .000 -.002 .000 .158 1 414 .691 
 2 .409
b
 .167 .163 .167 82.801 1 413 .000 
TBQ ratio
c
 1 .019
a
 .000 -.002 .000 .150 1 414 .699 
 2 .563
b
 .317 .314 .317 191.401 1 413 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant) Institutional ownership, 
b. Predictors: (Constant) Institutional ownership, Bank size. 
c. Dependent variables: ROA, ROE, TBQ ratio. 
From table 1 ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio were adopted as dependent variables, institutional ownership as an 
independent variable and bank size  as a moderating variable of bank specific characteristics. From the analysis 
it is revealed that the three performance measures were not able to explain the variance in the models and were 
not significant (Sig. F change >.05) in the first step.  F(1,414)=.857; P>.05 for ROA, F(1,414)= .691;P>05 and 
for TBQ ratio (1,414)= .699; P>.05. However, when bank size was introduced in model 2 as a moderating 
variable the variance in ROA was explained by 7% by the model as a whole. Since the probability of the F 
statistic P=.000 was less than the level of significance (.05) the null hypothesis that change in R
2
 was equal to 
zero was rejected and the hypothesis that bank size as a control variable reduced the error in predicting bank 
performance when ROA was adopted as a performance indicator was supported. The introduction of bank size as 
a control variable explained an additional 7.0% variance in ROA (R
2
 change=.070); F(1,413)=31.148; 
P>.000.Using ROE as a performance indicator in model 2, upon introduction of bank size as a control variable 
the regression results indicate that the variance in the ROE of commercial banks in Kenya was explained 16.7% 
by the model as a whole. Since the probability of the F statistic P=.000 was less than .05, the null hypothesis that 
change in R
2
 was equal to zero was rejected and the hypothesis that bank size as a control variable reduced the 
error in predicting the ROE of commercial banks in Kenya was supported. Introduction of bank size as a control 
variable explained an additional 16.7% variance in ROE (R
2
=.167).When TBQ ratio was adopted as a 
performance measure in the relationship between institutional ownership and TBQ ratio in model 2, it will be 
noted that when bank size was introduced as a control variable, the results from the regression model indicate 
that the variance in TBQ ratio of commercial banks in Kenya was explained by 31.7% by the entire model. 
Introduction of bank size as a control variable explained an additional 31.7% variance in ROE (R
2
=.317).The 
probability of the F statistic P=.000 that was significant at 5% level. From these findings the null hypothesis that 
R
2
 was equal to zero was rejected and the hypothesis that bank size reduces the error in predicting TBQ ratio was 
supported. 
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Table 3 Coefficients
c
 
Performance 
Indicator 
Model Independent 
Variables 
B Std 
Error 
Beta t Sig. Tolerance V.I.F. 
ROA
c
 1 Constant .025 .003  8.927 .000   
  Institutional 
ownership 
.002 .010 .009 .180 .857 1.000 1.000 
 2 Constant -.044 .013  -3.448 .001   
  Institutional 
ownership 
.001 .009 .004 .090 .909 1.000 1.000 
  Bank size .017 .003 .264 5.581 .000 1.000 1.000 
ROE
c
 1 Constant .128 .011  11.530 .000   
  Institutional 
ownership 
-.015 .038 -.020 -.397 .691 1.000 1.000 
 2 Constant -.288 .047  -.6.154 .000   
  Institutional 
ownership 
.021 .035 -.027 -.592 .554 1.000 1.000 
  Bank size .101 .011 .409 9.100 .000 1.000 1.000 
TBQ ratio
c
 1 Constant .908 .105  8.646 .000   
  Institutional 
ownership 
.139 .359 .019 .387 .699 1.000 1.000 
 2 Constant -
4.520 
.402  -11.247 .000   
  Institutional 
ownership 
.068 .297 -.014 .009 .228 1.000 1.000 
  Bank size 1.322 .096 .563 13.835 .000 1.000 1.000 
c. Dependent variables: ROA, ROE TBQ ratio 
Table 3 presents further results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis that demonstrate the relationship 
between institutional ownership and accounting-based performance indicators ROA, financial accounting 
measure; ROE and the market measure of performance TBQ ratio of commercial banks in Kenya while 
moderating for bank size. In model 2 (Table 3) all the three performance indicators (ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio) 
were found not to be significant in explaining the relationship between institutional ownership and performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya. It is only the control variable (bank size) that was found to be significant when 
all the three performance indicators were used. This invariably means that bank size has a moderating effect. It is 
worth noting that the data used in the analysis (Table 3) does not indicate any multicolinearity problem. 
Multicolinearity only becomes of concern when the Variance inflation factor (V.I.F.)  is greater than 10 Myers, 
(1990) and when tolerance is less than 0.2 (Menard, 1995). 
 
The above findings are in line with those of Pound (1988) where one may draw conclusions to the effect that 
institutional investors in the Kenyan banking sector may be characterized as pressure sensitive investors who 
may not pay a lot close attention in monitoring commercial banks performance since they enjoy some business 
relationship with some of these banks. These findings are supported by: Craswell et al.(1997) who find no 
significant correlation between institutional ownership and firm performance, Loderer & Martin (1997) who find 
no significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance and Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) who find no significant association between institutional ownership and firm performance based on a list 
of 383 firms they studied.  
5. Conclusion 
The results presented in the study confirm the relationship between institutional ownership and performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. Most of the institutional investors in Kenya are known to have business relationship 
with the commercial banks in which they hold ownership stake. In view of this, they may not effectively monitor 
the performance of these banks lest they risk damaging the business relationship that they enjoy. Institutional 
investors are known to be cost-efficient rather than engage themselves in monitoring activities of the firm they 
are interested in short term returns even if such are temporal in nature which may be at the detriment of the bank. 
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From the findings it can be realized that the effect of institutional ownership on the performance of commercial 
banks in Kenya still remains an empirical question that call for further research.  
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